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TAXATION - I.R.C. SECTION 115 ( G) -TRANSACTION EQUIVALENT TO
TAXABLE DIVIDEND-P and B owned all the outstanding shares of X Corporation. In 1937 P purchased B's shares and gave as consideration his notes
bearing maturity dates varying from one to ten years. Two years later P
transferred these shares to X Corporation, to be held as treasury stock, in
return for the corporation's promise to discharge P's obligations to B as they
matured. Pursuant to this agreement X paid $5,000 to B in discharge of one
of P's notes. The commissioner treated this payment as a taxable dividend to P
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RECENT DECISIONS

under section II5 (g) of the Internal Revenue Code 1 and assessed a deficiency.
P paid the tax and brought an action in the district court to recover the payment,
but his claim was denied. On appeal, held, affirmed. lVall v. United States,
(C.C.A. 4th, 1947) 164 F. (2d) 462.
The forerunner of section II5 (g) was section 201 (d) 2 of the Revenue
Act of 1921. In 1920 the Supreme Court had held in Eisner v. Macomber 3
that Congress did not have the power to tax stock dividends. With this in
mind Congress, in the Revenue Act of 1921, expressly exempted stock dividends
from taxation but enacted section 20 I ( d) which provided that a distribution
of earnings by stock dividends was to be treated as taxable income if and when
this stock was cancelled or redeemed in such a manner as to make the transaction the substantial equivalent of a taxable dividend. This provision was repeated as section 201 ( f) 4 in the 1924 Revenue Act but it became much more
significant inasmuch as section 201 ( c) of that act declared that distributions in
liquidation, including partial liquidation were to be treated as proceeds of sale
or exchange of stock. Thus but for section 201 (£) there would have been
nothing to deter a corporation from distributing earned surplus by redeeming or
cancelling stock dividends and giving its stockholders the benefit of the capital
gain provisions of the act 5 rather than subjecting them to the high surtax which
would have been imposed if cash dividends had been paid. With the purpose of
the statute in mind, obviously the redemption of stock dividends which had been
issued for the sole purpose of obtaining the tax advantages of a partial liquidation
fell within the provisions of section 201 (£). 6 Even if the stock dividends were
issued for a valid business purpose, some courts held the subsequent redemption
or cancellation the equivalent of a dividend. 7 Since 1926 the various Revenue
Acts have inserted a provision in I I 5 (g) which makes the section applicable
whether or not such stock was issued as a stock dividend. 8 Thus, when the
0

52 Stat. L. 496 (1938), 26 U.S.C. (1940) § 115 (g).
42 Stat. L. 228, § 201 (d) (1921).
8
252 U.S. 189, 40 S.Ct. 189 (1920); 9 A.L.R. 1594 (1920).
4
43 Stat. L. 254 at 255, § 201 (1924). This section amended the 1921 Act to
include the situation where cancellation or redemption preceded the stock dividend.
5
Section 208 of the 1924 Act, 43 Stat. L. 263 (1924), gave taxpayers other
than corporations an option to be taxed on capital net gains at a rate of 12,¼ per cent
provided they had owned the capital asset for two years. Under the 1921 Act,
liquidating distributions, partial or complete, were taxable as dividends. See Commissioner v. Sansome, (C.C.A. 2d, 1932) 60 F. (2d) 931, cert. den., 287 U.S. 667,
53 S.Ct. 291 (1932).
6
C. A. Goding, 34 B.T.A. 201 (1936); Leopold Adler, 30 B.T.A. 897 (1934),
affd., (C.C.A. 5th, 1935) 77 F. (2d) 733.
7
J. Natwick, 36 B.T.A. 866 (1937); Annie Watts Hill, 27 B.T.A. 73 (1932),
affd., (C.C.A. 4th, 1933) 66 F. (2d) 45; contra, Patty v. Helvering, (C.C.A. 2d,
1938) 98 F. (2d) 717, but see Kirschenbaum v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 2d, 1946)
I 55 F. (2d) 23 at 24, overruling the Patty case and others as supposedly inconsistent
with Commissioner v. Estate of Bedford, 325 U.S. 283, 65 S.Ct. 1157 (1945).
8 44 Stat. L. II, § 20 I (g) ( I 926) ; this section was changed to II 5 (g) in,
1928, 45 Stat. L. 822, § 115 (g) (1928).
1
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stock has not been issued as a dividend the courts have looked to the particular
facts of the case to determine whether the same result could have been effected
by paying a dividend. 9 Applying this flexible test to the principal case it seems
clear that the transaction was equivalent to a dividend since P's personal obligation was paid out of corporate earned surplus.10 It cannot be said that the
stock transferred to the corporation was consideration for the discharge of his
obligation for in actual effect he still owned I oo per cent of the outstanding
stock so that his control and proportionate interest were undiminished.11 P
argued that since this stock was held as treasury stock it was not redeemed or
cancelled within the meaning of the statute. This argument has not prevailed
in other cases 12 and is particularly weak in the principal case, for the corporation
is a one-man corporation and whether this stock will be redeemed or cancelled
depends entirely on P's determination. The taxpayer's final contention was
that the two transactions should be considered as a direct sale from B to X corporation and therefore he should incur no tax liability. This contention was
rejected by the Court on the grounds that P had actually become indebted to B
and that a taxpayer's method of attaining a result is determinative for tax purposes. 13 It is submitted that a ·more desirable answer to P's argument would be
to point out the fallacy of his assuming he had two methods of achieving the
desired result. It is doubtful that in I 937 B would have agreed to sell his
shares directly to the corporation knowing that the transaction might have been
considered a distribution in partial liquidation instead of a sale; at that time such
distributions were treated as short term capital gains and B would have been
taking the needless risk of subjecting himself to a higher tax.14
Bayard E. Heath, S. Ed.
9 Hyman v. Helvering, 63 App. D.C. 221, 71 F. (2d) 342 (1934); Brown
v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 3d, 1935) 79 F. (2d) 73; McGuire v. Commissioner,
(C.C.A. 7th, 1936) 84 F. (2d) 431;
10 Douglas v. Willcuts, 296 U.S. I at 9, 56 S.Ct. 59 (1935); IOI A.L.R. 397
(1936).
11 See Hyman v. Helvering, 63 App. D.C. 221, 71 F. (2d) 342 at 344 (1934).
12 James D. Robinson, 27 B.T.A. 1018 (1933), affd., (C.C.A. 5th, 1934)
69 F. (2d) 972; J. Natwick, 36 B.T.A. 866 (1937); contra, Alpers v. Commissioner,
(C.C.A. 2d, 1942) 126 F. (2d) 58.
•
13 This was the language used in Woodruff v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 5th, 1942)
131 F. (2d) 429 at 430.
,
14 I.R.C., § 115 (c), 49 Stat. L. 1687 (1936), declared: "Despite the provisions of I I 7 (a), IOO per centum of the gain • . . recognized shall be taken into
account in computing net income, except in the case of amounts distributed in complete
liquidation of a corporation." Actually, as is pointed out by Darrell, "Corporate
Liquidations and the Federal Income Tax," 89 UNiv. PA. L. REv. 907 at 91 I
( I 941), the courts were quick to help the taxpayers and call the transaction a sale
to give them the benefit of I I 7 (a). Nevertheless, it was a risk to contend with and
B would probably have not desired to take it. Today distributions in liquidation are
accorded the same treatment as sales and exchanges [26 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1946)
§ 11 5 (c)]. If a taxpayer is faced with a business situation similar to the one in the
principal case it would certainly be to his advantage to persuade the vendor to sell
the stock to the corporation.

